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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to show that the Allies of the Second World War
formed a major, yet largely overlooked site of mid-twentieth-century
internationalism. Historians have tended to tell national stories about
this coalition, built around its leaders and their bilateral relationships
and conﬂicts, such as the ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship
between Churchill, Roosevelt and their generals. The present study,
by contrast, foregrounds the military and civilian planners working
underneath them, as well as the inter-Allied institutions that facili-
tated their cooperation. This is a half-forgotten chapter of the war’s
history: a series of technical, so-called ‘combined’ organs designed to
plan Allied grand strategy and operations, pool their productive
resources, and unify their theatre-level military commands, set up
by Great Britain and the United States after the latter’s formal entry
into the war in December 1941. The planners serving on these boards
and committees, the paper furthermore shows, described their work
in explicitly internationalist terms. ‘Combination’, as these insiders
called it, meant putting the objective needs of Allied strategy ahead
of narrow national interests. Its history is more than merely Anglo-
American: involving Canadian, French and other European actors, it
encompassed the wider trans-Atlantic and foreshadowed the later
Atlantic alliance. Indeed, since several key shapers of post-war
European integration, notably Jean Monnet, were closely involved
in the combined experiment, this paper shines new light on a warlike
root of European cooperation. Thus, it opens a dialogue between the
history of war, internationalism and Europeanisation.
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In the Second World War, victory went to the side that, notably, best managed the
challenge of global warfare through international cooperation and integration. The Allies
did much better than the Axis in this endeavour, through an elaborate system of
permanent inter-Allied councils, civil-military boards of technical experts, wartime
summits and multinational commands. As Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, the United
States Navy (USN)’s most senior oﬃcer,1 noted some years after war’s end:
In ﬁghting a global war, it is essential that global and comprehensive service points of view
be given due weight in the councils which must arrive at well considered global decisions.
A point of view focused solely on Europe, solely on the Paciﬁc, solely on land warfare, solely
on air warfare, solely on naval warfare, or any point of view which neglected any of the above
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vital aspects, could scarcely avoid faulty decisions, faulty decisions which would have wasted
additional billions of treasure and tens of thousands of lives.2
At ﬁrst sight, King’s admonition seems uncontroversial, even unsurprising. In the
historiography of the Second World War, however, it is. King is known neither as
a globalist nor as a proponent of good inter-service cooperation. An abrasive personality
who, it was said, was ‘so tough [he] shave[s] with a blow torch’,3 King is above all
remembered as a ﬁerce partisan who put the interests of the Paciﬁc War against Japan,
and especially those of his own service in it, before those of other theatres and Allies. As
one historian observes, it was often hard to tell ‘whether King’s bitterest enemy was the
Japanese, the British or the American army’.4
Yet King’s words, written in private a few years after 1945, were more than mere
rhetoric. As this paper argues, they formed part of a shared discourse among the top
planners of the Anglo-American war eﬀort after 1941, an internationalist discourse to
which the transcendence of narrow national and service interests through military
technocracy was central. Such technocracy lay at the heart of the elaborate war organiza-
tion set up by Britain and the US after the latter’s entry in December 1941. Both
proponents of the transnational integration of the Allied war eﬀorts and partisans of
national or even individual service war eﬀorts, like King, worked within it. The passage
cited earlier refers to the admiral’s work as part of the Combined Chiefs of Staﬀ (CCS),
the uniﬁed forum of the British Chiefs of Staﬀ (COS) and the US Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ
(JCS), the ﬁrst truly corporate body of the US military and naval staﬀs – created, as we
shall see, especially to participate in the CCS.5 It follows a discussion, several pages long,
of the Allies’ 1943 decision to divert greater resources to the Paciﬁc War than foreseen in
earlier strategic plans, which accorded Japan only minor priority as an enemy, and saw
Asia and the Paciﬁc as peripheral theatres. Though certainly a USN partisan who saw the
Paciﬁc as the only theatre where his service could shine, and a sceptic of close relations
with the British, King nevertheless took part in the internationalism of the CCS and other
organs attempting to integrate the Allied war eﬀorts, because it provided the legitimating
framework for decision-making within these coalition fora.
This special issue is a welcome opportunity to take seriously the internationalism of
generals and admirals. ‘Internationalism’ has in the past three decades emerged as an
analytical category ‘central to the major political questions and themes of the twentieth
century: war and peace, imperialism and nationalism, states and state-building’, as Glenda
Sluga and Patricia Clavin argue in a recent survey.6 Meant to both describe and explain the
‘movements of people, goods, ideas and practices across national boundaries and
continents’,7 the history of internationalism is closely related to transnational and global
history. Indeed, historians initially used it as a synonym for the transnational and global
turns that began in the late 1980s.8 This makes it a fuzzy concept that continues to overlap
with transnationalism. It can assume multiple meanings, describing both ‘the domain of
international relations, as formal diplomatic contacts between nations, as much as the
movement (both linear and circular) of people and their ideas, networks and imaginations
across borders’.9 This is not necessarily a weakness. As Jessica Reinisch cautions,
a ‘restrictive focus on deﬁnitions and normative prescriptions’ for what constitutes ‘real’
internationalism, and attempts to rigidly deﬁne it against transnationalism and global
history, are counter-productive. It is more useful to think of ‘“internationalisms”, in the
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plural’, with due attention for the diversity of forms it has taken, including black, women’s
and other non-elite internationalisms, global religions and even transnational fascism, as
well as to the ‘dark sides’ of mainstream liberal internationalism, including race, force,
empire and collaboration with violently anti-liberal regimes.10
The Allies of the Second World War formed a major and successful case of transna-
tional cooperation. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the key role of interna-
tionalism in Allied – or, as they were known after 1941, the United Nations’ – ideology,
propaganda and post-war planning.11 Yet much of the specialist scholarship on this
military alliance continues to follow ‘realist’ theories of international relations, which
emphasize the primacy of national interests, security and power, and consequently depict
coalitions as pacts of convenience between fundamentally self-interested states.12 In the
case of the Allies, this has meant an overwhelming focus on the great powers – the so-
called Big Three of Britain, the Soviet Union and the US – and on inter-Allied competi-
tion. To cite one inﬂuential title, the anti-Axis coalition was composed of both ‘allies and
adversaries’.13 Alliance politics are, accordingly, depicted as a series of bilateral relation-
ships between closed national units, whose war eﬀorts appear entirely separate and
national. A good illustration of this is the ‘league tables’ found in political-economic
accounts, which compare national military spending, production, mobilization and so
on.14 This mode of accounting gives little impression of the global and interdependent
character of Allied war ﬁnances and production and ignores large parts of both the
coalition and the world war. Thus, France drops out after 1940, Britain is reduced to the
United Kingdom alone, and major contributors of men, ﬁnances, resources and produc-
tion such as China, India and Canada (the fourth economy of the war) are left out
entirely. Diplomatic and military-strategic histories, meanwhile, foreground inter-Allied
tensions over the demand for a ‘second front’ in Europe after 1941, understood as
a conﬂict of national interests, for instance between British colonialism in the
Mediterranean and US anti-imperialism and thirst for foreign markets.15 Specialists of
the Western Allies, ﬁnally, likewise emphasize national conﬂict. These readily admit to
the unique closeness of Anglo-American cooperation in particular, focusing much
attention on the CCS and uniﬁed Allied commands, such as General Dwight
Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) of D-Day
fame. Yet their Anglo-American character is taken to mean that they were extensions
of the so-called ‘special relationship’, or arenas for the two powers’ competing interests.16
The ﬁrst, military-historical volume of the recent Cambridge History of the Second World
War (2015) contains no chapters considering the CCS or the Allied commands, bar
a single study on the British–US Combined Bomber Oﬀensive over Europe.17 Only quite
recently have the military historians David Rigby, Niall Barr and Robert Ehlers consid-
ered these bodies as institutions in their own right.18
The following pages seek to extend such insights. I focus on the period after the US’s
formal entry into the SecondWorld War in December 1941 up to the Cairo Conference of
November 1943. Rather than political leaders and diplomats, I concentrate on generals,
admirals and production experts. Most of these were British and US-born, but they
included others, notably Jean Monnet, much of whose post-1945 career can be seen as
building on his wartime experience. This fairly limited periodization and cast of characters
is deliberate, as these years saw the CCS and many other alliance institutions established
and major strategic choices made. A consensus among historians of the war also holds that
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the conﬂict reached a turning point and Allied victory was decided in this period.19 It also,
however, means passing over the time before the Japanese assault on the Euro-American
empires across Asia, which was crucial becausemuch of the alliance architecture set up after
US entry was modelled on the Anglo-French alliance of the First World War and 1939–40.
It alsomeans giving little consideration to the later years of the war, when the receding Axis
threat caused alliance politics to change and several key programmes of inter-Allied
cooperation, such as US Lend-Lease, were wound down. Nonetheless, it is hoped that
revisiting the creation and apogee of the Grand Alliance’s institutional infrastructure will
indicate that the coalition was greater than the sum of its parts.20
This article cannot but make a beginning to recovering the history of Allied internation-
alism at war. It unfolds in three parts. A ﬁrst section looks at the origins of the CCS and the
other ‘combined’ organs, and their place within the wider Allied coalition. The article then
turns to outlining the various combined boards and committees, focusing on those head-
quartered in Washington, sketching a brief history of the performance and fate of the Allied
war organization. A third and ﬁnal section turns to the ideas held by those who worked in the
combined organs. I argue that to both participants and observers, what was generally termed
‘combination’ constituted an important example of internationalism during and immediately
after the war, one much cited, for example, in the contemporary debate on the future of
international politics. Indeed, for some oﬃcers and civilian experts involved in organizing the
Allied war eﬀort from Washington, including but far from limited to Monnet, combination
was a project of waging war beyond the nation, putting the ‘objective’ needs of Allied strategy
before the national interest. This illustrates that the pursuit of the national interest was not the
only, or even the most important, driver of alliance politics.
‘United Nations High Command’: internationalism in the Allies’ war, 1941–5
Allied military internationalism reached its apogee after the Second World War went
global, following Japan’s assault on the Euro-American empires in December 1941. It
was not, however, new. It was modelled on the highly integrated mode of coalition warfare
pioneered by the Entente during the First World War, which was recreated by Britain and
France in 1939. This included a SupremeWar Council (SWC), the decision-making forum
of the Alliedmilitary and political leadership; a SupremeAllied Commander,Généralissime
Ferdinand Foch, appointed in April 1918; and an agency for inter-Allied import and
shipping coordination –in 1917–18, the Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC)
and, in 1939–40, the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee (AFCC).21 Several major
ﬁgures of post-1941 inter-Allied cooperation had direct working experience of its First
World War predecessor, including Monnet; US President Franklin Roosevelt; US Army
Chief-of-Staﬀ General George Marshall; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the main British
military representative in Washington from 1942 onward; and Sir Arthur Salter, the
British Ministry of War Transport (MWT)’s main representative in Washington after
1942.22 The usage of the words ‘combined’ and ‘combination’ to mean inter-Allied
cooperation, in fact, had originated in the little-known Anglo-French arms import opera-
tion in the US, in which Monnet, who chaired the AFCC, was directly involved.23 This
Anglo-French invention began to be translated into top-secret Anglo-American planning
in the wake of France’s armistice with Germany in June 1940. InMarch 1941, this produced
the so-called ABC-1 war plan, which called urgently for ‘the provision of the necessary
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machinery along the lines of a Supreme War Council for the co-ordination of the political
and military direction of the War.’24
The combined organs, consisting of seven major bodies, each with its own set of
subcommittees, were created in three stages in 1942–3.25 The ﬁrst four oﬃcial combined
organs were created following the ﬁrst Washington conference, codenamed ‘Arcadia’ and
held over three weeks between 22 December 1941 and 14 January 1942 between British
PrimeMinister Winston Churchill, Roosevelt and their staﬀs.26 Reﬂecting, in their military
and logistical ambits, the pressing needs of a coalition now in a global war, they were the
CCS, the civil-military Combined Munitions Assignment Board (CMAB) under CCS
direction, and the separate Combined Raw Materials (CMRB) and Shipping Adjustment
Boards (CSAB).27 At Arcadia, Churchill and Roosevelt also created the ﬁrst Allied multi-
national command, American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM) under
the British General Sir Archibald Wavell, which covered the vast area from Burma to New
Guinea and Australia. These were followed by the Combined Production and Resources
(CPRB) and Food Boards (CFB) at the secondWashington conference (‘Argonaut’) of mid-
June 1942, set up, respectively, to prevent competitive buying of foodstuﬀs on the global
market, and to attempt ‘combined programming’, that is the integrated planning of the
Anglo-American war economies. Canada was included on CPRB in November 1942 and
CFB in October 1943, having already sat on the latter’s many commodity subcommittees
since 1942. Finally, the ﬁrst Québec conference of August 1943 (‘Quadrant’) created the
Combined Policy Committee (CPC) on the same trilateral basis, with the intent of
coordinating atomic bomb research.28
That Churchill and Roosevelt resurrected the Anglo-French practice of military inter-
nationalism upon the Second World War’s globalization is no coincidence. Waging global
war was a monumental task that required international coordination, planning and
organization by dedicated bodies of experts. As Churchill wrote FDR while en route to
Washington, in a letter largely drafted by his senior military planners, the need to ‘set up
joint machinery’ to take care of the ‘allocation of joint forces’ and the close coordination of
US with British and Allied war economies should be among the ‘main points of the
conference’.29 ‘Unifying the war eﬀort’ was likewise the object of feverish planning within
the State Department for Arcadia, with plans for Washington-based supreme political, war
and economic councils modelled directly on the Entente of 1917–19.30 ‘Unity of command’,
noted the senior British planner Brigadier Vivian Dykes, was ‘like a King Charles’s head’
among US Army staﬀers at Arcadia, who meant by the phrase that each Allied theatre
should be run by a single ‘supreme commander’ like Foch in 1918, rather than the British
practice of running theatre-level commands by inter-service committee.31 It was largely
Marshall’s work that led to Wavell’s appointment as Supreme Allied Commander of the
ABDA area.32 Only after the British and US chiefs-of-staﬀ had drafted a mission directive
for Wavell did Roosevelt propose ‘a new “Joint Body” in Washington’ to control and
support ABDACOM.33 This became the CCS. Since the SWC was not recreated, the CCS,
in tandem with the intermittent wartime summits, functioned as a sort of ersatz.34
Despite such behind-the-scenes compromises, contemporary observers were greatly
impressed by the outcomes of the ﬁrst and second Washington conferences. They saw
combination as the practical implementation of the ideal of the United Nations, another
product of Arcadia. The Economist breathlessly summarized the intent behind the Combined
Boards:
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The details were made known on Tuesday of the most comprehensive system of interna-
tional association the world has yet seen. The students of post-war leagues and federations
would do well to study it; the Axis states no doubt are already giving it their close attention.
The problem is to mobilise the resources of all the United Nations.35
In June 1942, following Argonaut, Time baptized the entire network of boards and
committees the ‘United Nations High Command’.36
Yet combination was far from a utopian project. It also served national interests, and ran
counter to the sovereign equality, at least in theory, of the United Nations. When Churchill
proposed Arcadia to Roosevelt, he wrote that he wanted to ‘review the whole war plan in the
light of reality and new facts, as well as the problems of production and distribution’. He had
been more candid to his War Cabinet on 8 December 1941, the day the US declared war on
Japan: the point was ‘to see Roosevelt to ensure that American help to this country does not
dry up’.37 The British COS initially wanted a US commander of ABDACOM, as they ‘foresaw
inevitable disasters in the Far East’ and did not wish Britain to be blamed; their US counter-
parts, Marshall and King, meanwhile, wantedWavell to serve directly under the COS, which
the latter rejected because of the not unreasonable ‘political danger of having all responsibility
(and blame) centred in London’.38 The CCS were created as a compromise.
There was, secondly, a strong element of hierarchy involved. When the other powers
involved in the ABDA area – Australia, the Netherlands and New Zealand – heard a joint
body would be set up to direct Wavell, they ‘naturally put in a claim to be represented’.39 It is
in this context that one should see Australian Labor PM John Curtin’s famous claim, in the
Melbourne Herald of 27 December 1941, that ‘Australia looks to America, free of any pangs
as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’ – a statement Curtin
preﬁgured by demanding ‘the fullest say in the direction of the Democracies’ ﬁghting
plan’.40 The experts at Arcadia had little patience for such demands, which they regarded
as the parochialism of lesser powers with no interests beyond their own region. British and
US Army planners thought they alone possessed the worldwide interests, coupled with direct
access to Churchill and Roosevelt, to direct the war’s various theatres on a truly global basis.
Giving the lesser Allies a say would only slow down decision-making. In the words of
Brigadier Ian Jacob, military secretary to the War Cabinet: ‘Only the combined U.S. and
British Chiefs of Staﬀ could control the Supreme Commander.’41 Oﬃcials were entirely open
about this. ‘We use the word “combined” to relate to any body representative of both
American and British interests,’ Oliver Lyttelton, Britain’s Minister of Production, matter-
of-factly told the House of Commons in late June 1942.42
In the event, other Allies were involved in the CCS and Boards’ aﬀairs, but only when
the agenda touched on their direct interests. Combination’s exclusionary character, as the
project of the English-speaking great powers, remained problematic until the war’s end
and after. The editors of The Observer, writing during the Casablanca Conference in
January 1943 (on the eve of the relief of Stalingrad) of the failure to involve the USSR,
thought there was
. . . a serious structural gap in the aﬀairs of the United Nations. [. . .] During 1942 Britain and
the U.S.A. have achieved a fairly high degree of co-ordination of strategy and uniﬁcation of
eﬀort. No such claim can be made for the United Nations as a whole. The permanent
common organs, which alone can transform a loose alliance into a real war-making unit,
exist, as far as Britain and the U.S.A. are concerned [. . . .] They do not exist as organs of the
United Nations as such.
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But this is a United Nations war. To conduct it as a British-American war, with a separate
Russian war running parallel to it, will certainly postpone victory and may jeopardise peace.43
As a 1945 pamphlet on post-war relief noted sardonically of the Combined Boards, these
were a British–US aﬀair, with a ‘small voice – a ninth part of a larynx, as it were – permitted
to Canada’.44While, with high hopes for post-warmultilateralism, the bilateral Boards were
quickly dismantled in 1945, parts of themilitary alliance infrastructure continued a skeleton
existence. As late as 1947, when Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, by then Chief of the
Imperial General Staﬀ (CIGS, head of the British Army), visitedMoscow, he was queried by
Stalin whether the CCS constituted a military alliance, prompting the US Army’s Plans and
Operations branch to prepare their dissolution in case Moscow applied pressure.45
The Combined Organisation, 1942–5: a sketch of a history
Was Stalin right to take the by then moribund CCS so seriously? By sketching a brief
history of the performance and some of the challenges faced by the combined organs, this
section seeks to contextualize the Soviet dictator’s query. It ﬁrstly provides a brief outline
of each individual combined organ, before considering the many issues and clashes
involved in an internationalist experiment of this scope in the midst of a global war.
What follows is far from exhaustive and limits itself geographically to Washington,
which, as the nerve centre of the world’s largest economy, had the most to add to the
common Allied pool.46
Themost consequential combined organs were themilitary CCS, the civil-military CMAB,
and the largely civilian CRMB, CSAB, CFB and CPRB. These were each further divided into
a legion of subcommittees that did the detailed planning work for approval by the main
committee. Not all of this took place in Washington. The CCS, for instance, were only
formally in session when the British COS and US Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ physically met, which
happened a total of 15 times, at the war’s major conferences. At Tehran (November–
December 1943) and after, the Soviet chiefs-of-staﬀ (Stavka) joined the CCS, but they were
never permanent members. In between summits, the Anglo-American staﬀs were split
between London and Washington. Nonetheless, they met weekly thanks to the appointment
of a special delegation drawn from the British Joint Staﬀ Mission (JSM) in the US capital,
headed until his death in 1944 byDill, who, before Arcadia, had beenCIGS. TheWashington-
based CCS organization consisted of a Combined Planning Staﬀ and Secretariat, as well as
Communications, Intelligence, Military Transport and Meteorological Committees.
Participation quite literally forced the US and Washington-based British military staﬀs to
work together, as they shared oﬃces, ﬁrst in the Federal Reserve Building, and then in the
PublicHealth Service Building onConstitutionAvenue, which came to be known throughout
the war as the CCS Building.47
CMAB, by comparison, formed the hub of a global network of like committees.
Together, these formed a global armaments distribution organization that allocated weap-
onry built by the largest producers, that is, the US and the British Empire.48 Since the bulk
of arms production was needed for the national services, only the surplus went abroad; the
US produced by far the largest surplus, making CMAB key. But there were also Munitions
Assignment Boards or Committees in Ottawa, London, Delhi and Canberra, which allo-
cated surplus Canadian, British, Indian and Australian production.49 Washington-based
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CMAB was subdivided into Army, Navy and Air Force Munitions Assignment
Committees. The distribution of arms with which CMAB and its sister organs in the
British Empire were tasked came fromnational military aid programmes, most importantly
the US’s Lend-Lease,50 Canada’s ‘billion-dollar gift’ (January 1942) and War
Appropriations (United Nations Mutual Aid) Act (May 1943),51 and Britain’s ‘reverse
Lend-Lease’. These programmes were central to what remains a very poorly studied chapter
of the Second World War – what was known as Mutual Aid, the United Nations’ state-
controlled global war economy.52
The Combined Raw Materials and Food Boards, by comparison, worked more like
international cartels, bringing together national ministries to coordinate food production
and imports from neutrals, like Argentina, to ensure low prices and constant supplies.
They were divided into commodity subcommittees. CFB, moreover, like CMAB, had
counterparts in London: the London Food Committee, later Food Council, which
channelled CFB recommendations to Empire countries; and a likewise London-based,
multinational Tea Allocation Committee, which surveyed the UN’s tea supplies and
requirements and drafted purchase and allocation plans for CFB.53 To add to this
complexity, there were also special combined committees created to either solve ad hoc
problems or address joint issues. A good example was the short-lived ‘Committee of the
Combined Boards’, called together by the US State Department in December 1942 to
coordinate the provision of food and raw materials to French North Africa following the
Allied landings there (Operation Torch). A predecessor to the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), it met until the end of January 1943.54
Like the aforementioned AMTC and AFCC, the combined bodies had no permanent
personnel and no executive powers of their own. Formally, they were mere fora for
national-state organs, who delegated their own personnel, provided the Boards’ chairmen
and carried out proposed programmes. In a bid to increase their eﬀectiveness, delegates
were either the heads of relevant ministries or federal departments or, as was often the
case on the British side, senior bureaucrats or oﬃcers with a history of involvement in
Allied-US collaboration. Thus, CSAB for example brought together Salter, who headed
MWT’s stateside Merchant Shipping Mission, with the unfortunately named Admiral
Emory Land, chief of the US War Shipping Administration (WSA). CMAB and its sister
organs worked on the same principle. Besides Chairman Hopkins, the Executive in
charge of coordinating its programmes was General James H. Burns, a supply oﬃcer
who had worked to expedite arms exports to the Anglo-French alliance since 1939. Since
1941, he had been the White House’s main adviser on Lend-Lease. Time proﬁled him in
June 1942 as the ‘munitions man’ on the ‘United Nations High Command’.55 The CCS,
ﬁnally, were a special case, as the corporate body of the British and US staﬀ organizations.
Their Washington branch brought together senior oﬃcers on both sides, several of whom
went on to senior Allied command.56
To facilitate combination, a signiﬁcant branch of the British state was established in
Washington. Christened ‘overseas Whitehall’ by participants,57 it consisted of very large
military, civilian production and supply, and diplomatic missions, which together totalled
some 9000 staﬀ at their peak in June 1943 –signiﬁcantly, also the peak year of US-federal
government employment.58 Themilitary mission, the aforementioned JSM, was the largest,
numbering some 3000 employees by late 1942. The British side of the Combined Boards,
meanwhile, was drawn from the British Supply Council (BSC), the ‘federal’ body of British
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF HISTORY: REVUE EUROPÉENNE D'HISTOIRE 159
supply missions in the US, many of which dated back to the Anglo-French alliance. In
wartime, the BSC grew to some 1800 employees. Although 9000 was a miniscule number
compared to the 505,000 non-industrial members of the British Civil Service at its peak in
1944 or the almost 3 million in the US federal government, and smaller yet compared to the
4.9 million British men and women in uniform by 1945, it was comparable to an average
mid-1930s Whitehall ministry and many times larger than the League of Nations
Secretariat.59 To house these employees, His Majesty’s Government leased, in whole or in
part, 31 buildings in Washington in addition to further oﬃces in New York. The number
named here, it bears underlining, does not include the thousands more women whose
clerical work as typists, stenographers, switchboard operators etcetera made that of themen
possible.60 Finally, overseas Whitehall was just the largest expatriate community among
many, including Australian, Canadian and New Zealand JSMs, as well as Belgian, Chinese,
Dutch, French, Soviet and more military-diplomatic missions. Together, these made
wartime Washington the second capital of the United Nations after London, the capital
of anti-Axis Europe.61
Formed to wage war on an internationalist basis yet supervening on the nation-state, the
combined war machinery experienced serious teething problems as it grappled with the
challenges of global war in 1942–3. Firstly, although clearly intended to further the integra-
tion of the Anglo-American war eﬀorts, beyond this general commitment the combined
organs’ functions were poorly deﬁned. Moreover, they had no clear legal status: the
Churchill-Roosevelt agreements that created them never went beyond memoranda of
understanding. The leaders published a press release on the ﬁrst Combined Boards in
January 1942, according to which their purpose was ‘to further the coordination of the
United Nations [sic] war eﬀort’.62 Similarly, in the secret memorandum on ‘post-Arcadia
collaboration’ that formally instituted them, theCCSwere ‘to provide for the continuance of
the necessary machinery to eﬀect collaboration between the United Nations’.63 However,
while Churchill presented the January 1942 Boards agreements to Parliament as a White
Paper, they were never backed by FDR with equivalent Executive Orders.64
The combined organs’ functions as described in these memoranda were, secondly,
vague and hardly uniform. Some had considerably more ambitious missions than others.
The CCS’ task seemed clear in the post-Arcadia memorandum: ‘(a) Determine and
recommend the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy; (b)
Submit general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons
of war; (c) Settle the broad issues of priority of overseas movements.’65 In practice,
however, agreeing on a correct strategic policy and the relative priority of the war’s
theatres proved extraordinarily diﬃcult and highly political. Similar problems of inter-
pretation beset the Combined Boards. All operated on the basic principle that the whole
‘resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool,
about which the fullest information would be interchanged’, as the CFB memorandum
read.66 Yet the interpretation of pooling diﬀered per Board, and in more than one case
proved contentious. CMAB and its sister organs, as we have seen, only pooled surplus
armaments. CRMB and CFB’s cartel practices served primarily to pool information about
imports. CSAB, as we shall see shortly, could not agree on a technique of pooling. CPRB,
ﬁnally, had the most ambitious mission: like the AFCC, it was to ‘combine the production
programs of the [US, UK and Canada] into a single integrated program, adjusted to the
strategic requirements of the war’.67
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The real Achilles’ heel of the combined organization, however, was not its unclear
mandates, but the role played by British–US national agencies. Both the CCS and each
Board, save CRMB, experienced serious diﬃculties in securing the cooperation of
national agencies in 1942–3, owing to conﬂicts over jurisdiction among them.
Crucially, the problem lay primarily within rather than between the two states. It was
particularly acute in the US, where a riot of overlapping agencies was established in 1942
to manage the country’s eﬀort towards total mobilization. These new agencies, of which
the most important were the War Production Board (WPB) and Land’s WSA, bitterly
disputed the control of mobilization with older departments.68 Two examples, that of
CSAB and the CCS, serve to illustrate the point.
The internal US jurisdictional disputes that beset CSAB resulted in its permanent
bypass. The Shipping Board suﬀered from the fact that, although WSA represented the
US because it oversaw the country’s merchant shipbuilding programme, control over
overseas shipping movements lay with the Army and Navy. Over the course of 1942,
Admiral Land tried but failed to wrest control of movements from the armed services.
Anglo-American shipping correspondence consequently ran largely outside CSAB’s
formal meetings, through the British members of the Board’s own secretariat.
Accordingly, opinion in London on the Washington Board was that it existed primarily
‘to bring together the thought of both controlling centres’ rather than to actually direct
movements, as a late 1942 MWT memorandum put it. Reﬂecting this attitude, Lyttelton
at the end of 1942 cut a deal directly with Roosevelt to reallocate part of WSA’s
production to Britain. Salter in early 1943 pressed Land to make this bilateral deal
CSAB’s recommendation. Furious, Land and WSA began stonewalling the Board, to
which the British responded by bypassing it entirely. Although it continued to exist on
paper, it was replaced in practice by the multilateral United Maritime Authority in 1944,
the predecessor of today’s International Maritime Organisation.69
The CCS also suﬀered from bureaucratic inﬁghting on the US side. The Army and
Navy had a weak tradition of inter-service collaboration and the country lacked an
integrated staﬀ organization on the European model, with its own secretariat and
jurisdiction over all forces, like the British COS. However, in this case Washington
responded early through the creation of the JCS in February 1942, in order to ensure it
had a say in combined strategy-making. It took time to overcome Army-Navy disdain
and mistrust of each other, just as it took time to overcome the services’ practice of
drafting separate strategic plans and procurement programmes, and refusing to share
dispositions. British planners, used to the more orderly procedures of Whitehall, were
shocked by this state of aﬀairs upon arrival in Washington at the end of 1941. ‘The
American machine of government seems hopelessly disorganised,’ Jacob complained at
Arcadia, after discovering that the president lacked a cabinet system, a private oﬃce and
a system of interdepartmental committees with secretariats of their own to coordinate
war policy.70 ‘Never have I seen a country so utterly unprepared for war,’ Dill thought. ‘It
seems to me that the whole organisation from a war point of view belongs to the days of
George Washington.’71 It was not until 1943 that the JCS managed to smooth out
debilitating Army-Navy conﬂicts and acquire something like a corporate identity. By
this time, the expression ‘let’s do a Marshall-King’, meaning to overcome inter-service
diﬃculties, had entered US military jargon.72 Reﬂecting such success, the 1947 National
Security Act enshrined the JCS, a relic of wartime internationalism, in the US national
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security state. The next and ﬁnal section turns to investigating the nature of such
internationalism among the military and civilian experts that ran the Allies’ war.
‘International and Impartial’: the politics of expertise at war, 1942–3
Conﬂicts over competence within the CCS and CPRB produced the clearest statements of
the political stakes involved in the Anglo-American war organization. These revolved
around the verb ‘combine’ and its derivatives, ‘combined’ and ‘combination’, which
deﬁned the discourse of the great democracies’ military internationalism. Originally
used within the Anglo-French supply organization in North America to connote
Allied–US cooperation, ‘combined’ was also used in the British War Oﬃce to connote
special inter-service operations (e.g. Combined Operations Headquarters, activated
July 1940).73 It was disambiguated at the Arcadia summit, coming to designate interna-
tional military cooperation only; ‘joint’ replaced it in its other meaning. As the post-
Arcadia memorandum stipulated, ‘the word “Joint” [should] be applied to Inter-Service
collaboration of one nation and the word “Combined” to collaboration between two or
more of the United Nations.’74 NATO still uses the two terms in this way today.
To some, behind this seemingly technical distinction lay a complete vision of how to
wage modern war. Brigadier Dykes, who was one of them, called this the ‘combined
approach’.75 According to this technocratic idea, war should be waged functionally,
subordinating national interests to the ‘objective’ requirements of strategy. It formed
one pole within a spectrum of expert views on how to organize the Allies’ war, ranging
through visions of Anglo-Saxon unity, through more practical views of managing an
international coalition, to outright sceptics who held fast to the primacy of national
sovereignty and interests. Such a diversity of opinion cannot be reduced to straightfor-
ward national diﬀerence, the framework in which accounts of the Allies in the Second
World War have long been placed.
The baseline for the CCS’s work was a kind of functional internationalism that placed
the demands of global strategy – that is, of all the United Nations – above that of any
particular nation. These terms deﬁned the debates on grand strategy that, in 1942–3,
followed in the wake of Japan’s conquest of Southeast Asia, which drove an 8000-
kilometre-wide wedge between the Allies in Asia and Australasia, and stretched their
global shipping resources to the limit. Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith (of later
fame as Eisenhower’s chief-of-staﬀ), Dykes’s US counterpart on the Combined
Secretariat, summarized the issue in a letter to Major General Sir Hastings Ismay,
Churchill’s closest military adviser, on the eve of the Casablanca Conference. He stressed
. . . the vital necessity for a determination at the earliest possible moment of a major strategy
for the United Nations. Unless our great men sit down and reach a deﬁnite decision as to
whether we exploit the Mediterranean area, push a campaign in the Paciﬁc and Burma, or
build up in UK for ‘Round-Up’ [the invasion of the European continent], we shall continue
to ﬂounder and will be absolutely unable to pull together.76
Much of the specialist scholarship has focused on these disagreements. Less attention has
focused on the broad consensus among the CCS and their staﬀers on what, conversely,
constituted improper grounds for strategy: partisan interests. The most common criticism
of particular plans was that they put self-interest before the common good of the United
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Nations. The Mediterranean war was regularly attacked in US planning circles for being
a British imperial concern. ‘Some of our oﬃcers’, AdmiralWilliam Leahy, Roosevelt’s chief-
of-staﬀ in the President’s capacity as US Commander-in-Chief and, as such, the JCS’s
chairman, noted of a White House meeting before the third Washington Conference
(‘Trident’) in May 1943, ‘have a fear that Great Britain is desirous of conﬁning allied
military eﬀort in Europe to the Mediterranean Area in order that England may exercise
control thereof regardless of what the terms of peace may be’.77
Such suspicions reached a crescendo in July 1942, when, in opposition to Torch, the
US Army and Navy top brass jointly proposed to FDR to ‘turn to the Paciﬁc and strike
decisively against Japan; in other words, assume a defensive attitude against Germany . . .
and use all available means in the Paciﬁc’.78 But the Paciﬁc, too, came in for the same
criticism. ‘Just because the Americans can’t have a massacre in France this year,’
Churchill remarked sourly after hearing of the JCS proposal, ‘they want to sulk and
bathe in the Paciﬁc.’79 The Army agreed to the Paciﬁc-ﬁrst proposal merely as a ‘bogey’
with which to pressure Britain, Smith told Dykes.80 Most in the War Department
regarded the Paciﬁc as the Navy’s private enterprise, and so a waste of resources.
Encapsulating such thinking, Secretary of War Henry Stimson recorded in his diary in
June 1942: ‘The Navy has been dead anxious to ﬁght in the Paciﬁc [. . .] And they have
been barely loyal in regard to following out [sic] the [Allied] plans.’81 The British were
well aware of the US Army and Navy’s ‘fundamental diﬀerences of view’, as Dill put it to
his successor as CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke, early in May 1942:
In one [Navy] document, this phrase occurred – ‘in support of the U.S. Army’s Bolero plan
[for the build-up of forces in Britain]’ [. . . .] The fact is that the two U.S. staﬀs are as yet
unable to reconcile their views and since they do not like to wash their dirty linen in our
presence, they naturally do not relish trying to put down United strategy in black and
white.82
The ideal of combination, namely to transcend national and inter-service partisanship
through expert objectivity and impartiality, did not only serve as a source of critique. It
also provided the discursive resources with which competing plans could be presented as
the true expression of all United Nations’ interests. Eisenhower, for example, who was
one of the Combined Planners before assuming Supreme Allied Command in North
Africa and the Mediterranean, distilled US Army thought on global strategy when, in
mid-1942, he wrote privately: ‘We’ve got to go to Europe and ﬁght, and we’ve got to quit
wasting resources all over the world, and still worse, wasting time.’83 In June 1942 the
British Army planner Geoﬀrey Bourne, who worked in the JSM, accompanied Marshall
to London in a failed bid to convince the British COS of the need for a cross-Channel
invasion in 1942. He explained British opposition as a failure to come up with ‘any
deﬁnite ideas upon United strategy as opposed to purely British strategy’.84 Conversely,
even those with a reputation for unilateralism and Anglophobia, such as Admiral King,
were not unreservedly opposed to combination. In June 1943, King proposed
a production scheme to Lyttelton ‘to get together to “standardize” equipment . . . to the
end that they shall become interchangeable – i.e. not require to be labeled “British” or
“American” but, rather, “Allied”.’85
Some working for the CCS and Combined Boards in Washington distilled the type of
language King used into a fully ﬂedged ideology. It was not uniform, and proponents varied
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in parsing it. All, however, agreed that it meant waging war beyond the nation, inter- or
supranationally. Some, like the Australian-American historian of the British
Commonwealth and former League employee Duncan Hall, who worked in the British
RawMaterialsMission and so for CRMB during the war, saw it as ‘a so purely Anglo-Saxon
aﬀair’ which involved the ‘intermeshing’ of the British–US states through ‘continuous
personal interpretation . . . on the Commonwealth principle of continuous consultation’. It
also involved an element of hierarchy, or, in Hall’s words, ranging ‘the free nations of the
world behind the Great Powers’.86 Hall’s perspective, though shorn of its Commonwealth
context, is particularly well preserved among historians of Anglo-American relations in the
idea of a ‘special relationship’. It contrasted, however, with that of men closer to the action.
To the Briton Dykes, for example, ‘combined’ was a synonym for ‘international’ and
‘objective’. He likened his combined approach to getting ‘on partnership terms’ or a ‘full
partnership game’, and contrasted it with what he called US ‘imperialism’, that is, the
narrow focus on national interests he perceived within the country. Dykes strongly agreed
with the aforementioned US oﬃcer, General Burns, who thought that the combined
machinery’s crucial secretariats ‘must be international and impartial, serving the commit-
tee and not any one nation’. The two men associated closely with Jean Monnet, who
remained in Washington throughout most of the war, working ﬁrst for the BSC and, after
a brief stint in Algiers with the Comité français de libération nationale, for the French
mission in the US. According to Monnet, ‘equipment [should be] allocated by theatres and
not on a purely nationalistic basis’ and that production be adjusted ‘in accordance with
[objective] strategic requirements’.87
The most radical expression of this ideology was made in the context of CPRB. Its
mission, as touched upon earlier, was what proponents called the ‘Supreme Co-
ordination’ or ‘combined programming’ (i.e. planning) of British and North American
war production.88 The Board was ﬁrst proposed as a ‘Joint Production Committee’ by
Dill in December 1941 at Arcadia, but was not adopted. Dill, seconded by Monnet, who
had close links with Roosevelt associates like Felix Frankfurter, continued lobbying for its
establishment, succeeding at the second Washington Conference in June 1942.
Composed of the British Ministry of Production, the US’s WPB and (from November)
the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply, supporters envisioned it as an
‘Economic High Command’ or a ‘Chiefs of Staﬀ for Production’.89 The most radical
adherents of such ideas, it bears underscoring, could be found on the US side, within
WPB and among Bureau of the Budget oﬃcials tasked with streamlining the federal
government’s relations with the Combined Boards. WPB, in an August report, projected
CPRB’s functions as ‘long-range planning on an inter-national scope’; to ‘develop,
promulgate and enforce speciﬁc combined programs’; to ‘decide appeals’ on, among
other things, ‘violations by national agencies of combined determinations’; and to take
over arms allocation powers from the CCS.90 Fired by such ambition, WPB’s Nelson
instigated CPRB chief-of-staﬀ General Henry Aurand to redirect 15,000 tons of shot steel
from the US Army to the British on combined programming grounds that same month.
Aurand agreed, without consulting the Army Supply Forces under his superior,
Lieutenant-General Brehon Somervell. Within a week, he was re-assigned, telling
Dykes ‘because he takes too objective a view – and not suﬃciently an American one’.91
Unsurprisingly, CPRB never became an economic high command. Already by the end of
September 1942, BOB oﬃcials involved in getting its operations oﬀ the ground
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complained to Leahy, who controlled access to Roosevelt as his chief-of-staﬀ, of ‘the
failure to date in utilizing’ CPRB.92 However, it was reconstructed in 1943 to focus on
non-military supplies to liberated areas; UNRRA based much of its work on the data and
studies of CPRB’s commodity subcommittees.93
As the Aurand incident indicates, there were of course sceptics of combination.
Brooke, Britain’s CIGS, was one of them. After the disbandment of ABDACOM in the
wake of the Japanese conquest of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, he wrote in
his diary that ‘we can at last . . . run the war on a rational basis!’ That meant dividing the
war into ‘two main spheres of interest – An American running the Paciﬁc up to Asia
including Australia & New Zealand, & a British one running the opposite way round the
globe including Middle East, India, Burma & Indian Ocean’.94 Rear-Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner, until March 1942 the head of the US Naval War Plans Division, similarly
considered the CCS an example of ‘large unwieldy bodies . . . in which British oﬃcials
would be given half the total authority for matters now solely under American control’.
He thought it unacceptable ‘that US interests would be subordinated to the interests of
the British Commonwealth’, because ‘British authorities do not understand the funda-
mental policies and strategic necessities of the US.’95 Combination, in short, involved
a politics of expertise which needs to be placed alongside narratives of national interest.
Conclusion
Allied internationalism was the victim of its own success. As noted earlier, most of the
combined organization was quickly dismantled after victory, although some of the bodies,
notably the CCS, existed on paper until 1947. While certain combined organs, such as
SHAEF and theCCS, are well remembered and studied, the internationalismof theWestern
Allied war organization was forgotten as national accounts of the SecondWorldWar began
to emerge after 1945.96 During and immediately after the struggle, by contrast, combination
played a signiﬁcant, if now overlooked role in public debate on the future of international
order. The Romanian-British economist and internationalist David Mitrany, for example,
cited the Combined Boards (‘grouping during the war’) as a prominent example of the sort
of ‘functional approach’ to international problems that, he argued, was the future of world
politics.97 Other prominent international thinkers likewise acknowledged the combined
organs’ signiﬁcance. E.H. Carr saw in such ‘haphazard and empirical expedients’ a ‘rough
approximation’ of a new ‘system of international security’.98 The CCS and the Combined
Boards were the only genuine examples of the State ceding national sovereignty that another
inﬂuential contemporary theorist of international relations, Hans Morgenthau, acknowl-
edged in his seminal Politics among Nations (1948).99
Taking such contemporary appraisals seriously, and approaching inter-Allied coop-
eration during the Second World War through the prism of internationalism, oﬀers new
insights into the alliance’s functioning and internal politics. The Allies were not simply
an ad hoc coalition of self-contained nation-states. An elaborate system of international,
so-called ‘combined’ bodies and commands, modelled on the Entente of 1917–19 and
Anglo-French alliance of 1939–40, served to integrate the various national war eﬀorts.
The CCS formulated grand strategy, the Combined Boards sought to integrate the war
economies, and the Supreme Allied Commanders controlled vast numbers of multi-
national troops. This system was far from perfect: an Anglo-American creation, it served
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to underline hierarchy among the Allies, while several of the Combined Boards in
particular failed to fulﬁl the high hopes vested in them. This was not necessarily, or
even primarily, the outcome of clashing national interests. In the CCS’s case, for example,
US inter-service dynamics, and ideologies of expertise like the ‘combined approach’,
played an equally great role. Key participants in the combined organization, such as
Marshall or Monnet, went on to play major roles in post-war trans-Atlantic relations and
European integration. Further research will have to bear out the precise connection
between their internationalism of war and that of peace.
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